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THE REFERENCE OF “GOD” REVISITED
Hugh Burling
I argue that the reference for “God” is determined by the definite description 
“the being that is worthy of our worship.” I describe two desiderata for rival 
theories of the reference of “God” to meet: accessibility and scope. I explain 
the deficiencies of a view where God is dubbed “God” and the name passed 
down by causal chains and a view where “God” picks out the unique satisfier 
of a traditional definite description. After articulating the “Worship-Worthi-
ness” view, I show how it best satisfies the desiderata. I then respond to some 
putative counterexamples to the view.
Introduction
What should our semantic theory for the term “God” be? How is it that 
when we use the term “God” referentially, it really picks out God? Al-
ternatively, what is picked out by “God”? Any answer to either of these 
questions will help answer the other. The answer I defend below is that 
the reference of “God” is determined via the implicit sense of the term, 
the definite description “the being that is worthy of our worship.” I think 
that this view leads inexorably in the direction of perfect being theism, but 
showing this goes beyond the scope of the argument here. To understand 
what is at stake in these two questions about how “God” refers and who 
“God” refers to, I begin by describing two focal desiderata for a semantics 
for “God”: what I call “accessibility” and “scope.” Both accessibility and 
scope catch various reasons given in favour of one theory against another 
and can be satisfied to greater and lesser degrees by different theories. Ac-
cessibility concerns how easy it is for individual “God”-users to meet the 
conditions on successful reference imposed by the theory. Scope concerns 
how much disagreement about the nature of “God”’s referent can be tol-
erated and how far our theory “draws together” parties to disagreements 
in co-reference rather than letting them “split apart” easily.
I examine three competing theories in contemporary philosophy of 
religion to see how they fare in meeting our desiderata. The first, which I 
will call the “Causal Reference” view (CR), has explicit defenders in both 
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William Alston1 and Meghan Sullivan.2 In short, CR tells us that “God” is 
a proper name bestowed by Abraham on the object of his religious expe-
riences3 and taught to his astronomically numerous descendants through 
a chain of testifiers. The second, which I will call the “Descriptive Deno-
tation” view (DD), is defended in hybrid form by Richard Gale,4 but is a 
good umbrella for “traditional” views given theologians’ habit of defining 
“God” in terms of a list of attributes that set Him apart from creatures. 
DD tells us that “God” picks out an object which uniquely satisfies a 
definite description, perhaps consisting in a precise list of predicates, or 
perhaps a cluster of them. The third view is candidate for a specific “tra-
ditional” view which I will call the “Worship-Worthiness” view (WW). 
The Worship-Worthiness view gives God’s worthiness of worship a more 
fundamental role than merely being an example of one of the properties 
DD requires, telling us instead that “God” refers simply to “the being that 
is worthy of our worship.”
For each view, I will articulate it and assess how far it satisfies the two 
desiderata. Ultimately, I conclude that the Worship-Worthiness view fares 
the best: it makes God more easily semantically accessible and supports 
the widest scope for co-reference between those who use the term “God.” 
It’s worth emphasizing, however, that this is a comparative argument: CR 
and DD are not “defeated,” with WW the “survivor.” Accessibility and 
Scope are not “fail-or-pass” necessary conditions for a successful theory 
of the reference of “God,” but rather desiderata which a theory can meet 
more or less successfully. Worship-Worthiness, I argue, meets them with 
more success than its rival, CR, and its less precise parent, DD.
Before proceeding, a significant qualification needs to be made to ev-
erything that follows. I tie up the accuracy of a semantic theory for “God” 
with how far it meets the Accessibility and Scope desiderata. Both desid-
erata crucially involve successful reference, albeit in different ways, by 
“God” to—something; what this something must be, is part of what the 
rival theories disagree about. But successful reference usually requires 
that the referent actually exist. This means that the accuracy of each theory 
is in turn going to depend to some extent on some extremely controversial 
matters of fact about metaphysics: for example, whether Abraham’s or 
some other prophets’ religious experiences really had independent objects 
as causes, or whether there is a being satisfying whatever list DD stipu-
lates, or whether there is in fact a being worthy of worship.5 Given the 
significance of the disagreements between the rival theories about what 
1Alston, “Referring to God.”
2Sullivan, “Semantics for Blasphemy.”
3This is an iteration of CR for “God” as used in the mouths of Abrahamic monotheists 
speaking English. Zoroastrians, for example, might translate “Ohrmazd” as “God” and 
thereby inherit “God” from Zarathustra’s initial ostension.
4Gale, On the Nature and Existence of God.
5My thanks to an anonymous reviewer for raising this issue.
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“God” might turn out to refer or fail to refer to, and not just about how 
successful reference comes about, it won’t be enough to simply stipulate 
that we are evaluating the rivals having taken something called “theism” 
for granted. The theories have implications for what the “proper” content 
of “theism” is. Instead, we can drive a wedge between those matters of 
metaphysical fact (whether a deity spoke to Abraham, whether there is 
an eternal creator or perfect being, and so on) and the relative success of 
the theories by considering how semantically accessible each makes their 
referent for “God,” and the Scope for co-reference they produce between 
users of “God,” another way. We should evaluate each theory in condi-
tional terms: if the referent of God the theory suggests “God” refers to did 
exist, how semantically accessible would that being be for “God”-users? 
And how much co-reference between doxastically divergent “God”-users 
would there be? This way the ability to meet either of the desiderata is 
unhitched from those metaphysical controversies which lie outside the lin-
guistic, phenomenological, and axiological considerations directly in play.
Accessibility
We find out what a word means by looking at how it works. Trivially, 
we do things with words by using them within what I’ll call “linguistic 
practices.” In natural languages, the rules governing these practices 
are implicit and often fuzzy or very complicated. Moreover, in natural 
languages, some terms and expressions can operate very differently in 
different contexts, so that it is helpful to think of those terms as being em-
ployed in a wider web of interlocking linguistic practices. For example: we 
are not primarily interested here in what we refer to, if anything, when we 
shout the term “God” when we get hurt; that is, while using the profanity 
practice;6 but instead we are interested in what the term refers to when 
we use it to discuss what God is like, to talk to Him, and to accomplish 
other goals and moves in the theistic religious linguistic practice. Note 
well that we use this practice not only to find out or teach others about 
God but, also, to attempt to draw ourselves closer to Him and carry out 
any duties we have toward Him which require language use. Given that 
peoples’ typical use of language is a universally available source of data 
about how words “work,” and that other sources such as metaphysical 
or axiological commitments are likely to be more controversial, I suggest 
that we analyze linguistic practices by adopting a charitable hermeneutic. 
This means taking practitioners’ expressions at face value except in cases 
where we have strong reasons to suppose some literary or rhetorical trope 
is at work. It likewise means taking intended or purported reference to be 
evidence, if defeasible, of actual reference. Given that natural languages 
both develop over time and between places, but are rule-governed enough 
6Sullivan (“Semantics for Blasphemy”) argues that blasphemy is uniquely wrong pre-
cisely because blasphemous uses confuse us about the rules of the theistic religious linguistic 
practice. She is not interested in blasphemy in this sense, however but in the sense of libelling 
God (160).
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to merit analysis, I would finally suggest that whether or not a “rule” ob-
tains within a practice does not depend on whether the words involved 
in the practice are always used in exactly the way that rule implies. Nor, 
I suggest, does a rule’s obtaining depend on unanimous agreement with 
that rule, among practitioners, were it described back to them. Indeed, if 
it did, the existence of philosophical disagreement about the semantics for 
“God” would mean that there could be no such semantics.
One easily discernible feature of the theistic religious practice is that 
most humans seem capable of playing it successfully. It doesn’t seem to re-
quire “special training.” Although we might use it better if we have certain 
kinds of training, children seem to be able to speak as intelligibly about 
and to God as they can about and to creatures. So, we can infer that God 
is highly linguistically accessible via the term “God.” What this evidence 
suggests is that, in general, successful reference to or denotation of God by 
“God” is easy to achieve. So, I contend that our linguistic habits indicate 
that the object, God, is highly, or very easily, accessible by the term “God.” 
For brevity I will also write as if accessibility pertains to the term, “God,” 
by which I only mean that it is easy for us to access God by using it. We are 
judging accounts as to whether they render “God” more or less accessible, 
and they do better where they make it more so.
A denier of the claim that “God” is very accessible might reject the above 
inference from the ability of children and the theologically untrained to 
properly use “God.” They might block the inference by claiming that ig-
norant or apparently untrained speakers have typically been raised in a 
religious tradition or in a culture with a theological hinterland; and this 
“catechesis,” or intellectual hinterland, will constitute a form of “special 
training.”
But consider those we have in mind under the class of “apparently un-
trained speakers”: not only small children in active religious communities 
but, also, those in post-religious societies. While a non-religious adult in 
such a society might have come across art and literature with religious 
themes, their children will not have intellectual access to the cultural hin-
terland which our objector appeals to as a form of special training. And the 
level of conceptual content in the “catechesis” enjoyed by a very young, 
but apparently competent “God”-user, will be very thin indeed. So, either 
the sense of “special training” is so thin that it is compatible with a very 
great deal of accessibility, and we arrive at the conclusion that “God” is 
highly accessible; or, the original inference goes through.
One specific demand this ease of access makes, evident from the above 
cases of ignorant or juvenile speakers, is that one can successfully refer to 
God by using “God,” without needing a sophisticated conceptual appa-
ratus related to one’s use or understanding of the term. According to this 
demand, a semantic theory for “God” will do better insofar as the concep-
tual resources demanded of its users are low enough to match many typical 
cases, such as the child at prayer or the questions of the spiritual seeker 
in a post-religious society. If such people are to use “God” successfully, 
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then such usage cannot require much by way of beliefs about God or un-
derstanding of the senses of predicates involved in such beliefs.
I don’t intend to settle the question of just precisely how linguistically 
accessible the theistic linguistic practice makes God—nor do I appeal to a 
precise value in my arguments below. Since below we are comparing three 
theories for accessibility, I hope that our familiarity with religious practices 
will indicate to us that the Causal Reference and Descriptive Denotation 
views do not account for sufficient accessibility and that Worship-Wor-
thiness does not make God “too” accessible. Dialectically, however, the 
accessibility criterion is on safe ground, since Alston, Sullivan, and Gale 
use concerns about conceptual demands7 and fragile causal chains8 to mo-
tivate their preferred views.
Scope
Users of the theistic religious linguistic practice should be able to co-
refer to God when they use the same term as each other—even when 
they strongly disagree about what the thing each calls “God” is like. Our 
different theories provide for co-reference in different ways; and those dif-
ferences mean that each theory implies a different scope for co-reference.
While I find it intuitive that our theory of how “God” refers will be pref-
erable the wider the scope for co-reference it establishes, a correct theory 
must draw the line somewhere. We only need to find one case where it 
is uncontroversial that two speakers uttering “God” in their language do 
not co-refer to show that such a line exists. Yet there are two aspects of the 
theistic religious linguistic practice which I think indicate that the right 
theory will extend co-reference very widely.
The first is the explicit language used in much religious and theological 
controversy. When Christians, Jews, Muslims and (many) Hindus disagree, 
they appear to disagree about the nature of the same object. Christians in-
sist that God was incarnate in Christ, but Jews insist that God has not been 
(and perhaps never will be) incarnate; Muslims claim that God is only one 
“person,” some Christians that He is three, and some Hindus that It is 
none. These are the sorts of claims which cut to the heart of theology. Dis-
agreements typically take the form of “I believe that a is F, but you believe 
a is G” or “We should φ a, not ψ a.” There is no inevitability to this, and it 
is what we would expect if co-reference is occurring. If co-reference were 
not the norm, we would expect a lot more disagreement to be couched 
differently. We would expect disagreements to typically take the form of 
“I believe there’s an x which is F, a, but no x which is G, but you believe 
there’s an x which is G, b,” or “We should φ a rather than ψ b.” We can re-
gard the assumption of co-reference as an explanation for why theological 
and religious disagreement tends to take the first two forms, rather than 
the latter two. If co-reference were not in place, then disagreements of the 
7See Alston, “Referring to God,” 116 and Sullivan, “Semantics for Blasphemy,” 161–163.
8Gale, On the Nature and Existence of God, 301.
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first two forms would not typically be genuine disagreements, but rather, 
the reference for “God” in the parties’ mouths would be “split”; and those 
parties would routinely labour under a misunderstanding, talking past 
each other.9 Perhaps there is an alternative explanation which is consistent 
with widespread “split reference” between “God”-users, but it seems to 
me that our motivation to look for such an explanation will be provided 
by evidence in favour of a view with low scope. A charitable, face-value 
reading of the language typical in religious and theological controversy 
puts the presumption in favour of high scope.10
The second arises from the translatability of “God” across languages.11 
Missionaries seem able to make theistic claims understood across very 
different cultures, often without shared linguistic histories. It is natural to 
suppose that such translation was easy due to shared reference by the two 
poles of the translation. If “God” (and its translations) refer to One Thing, 
and our minds are equipped to distinguish between that One Thing and 
other things, translation will be easy. If this explanation is right, the history 
of proselytism will provide evidence of very widespread co-reference.
Terms are sometimes (apparently) translated without co-reference. For 
example, a referent can be dubbed with a term in one language, and its 
features over time create a sense for that term; then a different referent, 
known to the speakers of a second language, can share enough of those 
features that the term is translated into whatever term in the second lan-
guage refers to the other referent. Over time, commerce between speakers 
of the two languages can come to clarify resulting confusions. Cases like 
this abound in the taxonomy of wildlife. Should we think that the trans-
lation of “God” is such a case? On the one hand, even if (for example) 
El-Shaddai and Chukwu were in fact two distinct individuals, despite 
Christian missionaries to Nigeria translating both as “God,” it would be 
much harder for us to establish that they are two distinct individuals than 
it is for biologists to establish the distinct speciation of two geographically 
separated populations in the same genus so that the “confusion” could be 
“cleared up.” On the other, when we reflect on the translation process, and 
the “clarification” process, we immediately begin to imagine instances of 
the theological controversies discussed above. Missionaries working in 
the cases we are considering tried to persuade the Igbo people that they 
9Versions of this argument for co-reference between Christians and Muslims have been 
offered by Dale Tuggy in his “The ‘Same God’ Controversy and Christian Commitment—
Part 1,” and by Sullivan (“Semantics for Blasphemy,” 163). 
10See Bogardus and Urban’s “How to Tell Whether Christians and Muslims Worship 
the Same God” (179–181) for an explanation of why these habits of disagreement do not 
guarantee co-reference between “God”-users in different traditions: it is possible that these 
practices obtain and yet co-reference is broken by reference shift. My argument here is that 
co-reference is a charitable “null hypothesis” which explains these features of theological 
disagreement and which we need good reasons to reject.
11An early version of the argument that the translatability of “God” between languages 
indicates co-reference between religious traditions can be found in Geach, God and the Soul 
(108–109).
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were mistaken about details concerning Chukwu’s activities and nature, 
not Its existence as opposed to El-Shaddai’s—if they had taken the latter 
strategy, “Chukwu” would not now translate “God” in Igbo translations 
of the Bible. I take it to be the null hypothesis, or at least more charitable, 
to suppose that missionaries and converts at the time could discern the 
common reference of different terms, rather than that they were “misled” 
by similarities between two different (postulated) beings.12
Alternatively, there is the possibility that instead of co-reference across 
languages, there has occurred reference change over generations of con-
tact between dominant monotheistic, and dominated heno-, panen-, or 
polytheistic cultures. In the Chukwu case, then: the term comes to refer to 
the same thing as “God” as converts outnumber traditionalists among the 
Igbo people. Again, however, I think that an interpretation of the history 
of “God” which is charitable to its users shows this possibility to be just 
that; the actual use of the word indicates co-reference.
Assuming co-reference between the missionary and convert, such lin-
guistic-historical evidence also tells in favour of both kinds of accessibility, 
since any necessary concepts must be coarse-grained enough to be avail-
able from within unconnected intellectual histories.
Finally, inclusivist accounts of theological knowledge, or pluralistic 
philosophies of religion, according to which all or most “religions” are 
“really about” the “same thing,” such as John Hick’s,13 depend on a very 
extensive co-reference for “God” between speakers with very different 
arrays of theological beliefs and concepts. This means that theories of the 
reference of “God” which support wider co-reference will benefit from the 
support of arguments for pluralism or inclusivism, be these arguments 
moral, prudential, phenomenological, or epistemic.14
The above two arguments together make a generous scope for co- 
reference a desideratum of theories of how “God” refers.
12This is the interpretation of the interaction between the Ibo and Christian missionaries 
described by Edmund Egbo in his “A Reassessment of the Concept of Ibo Traditional Religion” 
(75–79). I emphasise that this interpretation is charitable with respect to the motivations of 
missionaries, their local collaborators, and conversions being intellectual or theological—as 
one anonymous reviewer has pointed out, developments in translations between religious 
linguistic practices can be driven by pragmatic considerations as well as the desire to “get 
it right.” If we assume, however, that these translation practices are routinely “infected” by 
considerations that would lead their development to tend away from a coherent semantics 
or successful reference, then we should expect there to be no successful semantic theory for 
a term with as broad a history as “God”—only a series of case-by-case explanations of use.
13An influential example of a pluralism which guarantees that all religions are about the 
same thing is John Hick’s. Unfortunately, Hick’s account risks rendering all religions being 
about something which might lead many “God”-users to cease worshipping it: a Kantian 
noumenon he calls “the Real” (An Interpretation of Religion, 241–249).
14I thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing out that particular versions of pluralism 
or inclusivism might include or generate claims of co-reference between different uses of 
“God” which many readers would find highly contentious—Hick’s in particular. But this 
need not deprive the scope criterion of the support it receives from any arguments for these 
views, wherever the arguments do not themselves entail contentiously wide scope.
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Since the arguments for greater accessibility and wider scope involve 
empirical generalizations about religious and theological practice, they do 
not support precise delineations as to how much “split reference” a theory 
can allow or produce, nor how semantically vulnerable it can make or 
allow “God” to be, before it becomes unacceptable. Nor do they give clear 
instructions for how to weigh these desiderata against each other and 
against other considerations. In considering the three competing views 
below, therefore, they will help us to organize our judgments and see 
connections in the current debate, but will not straightforwardly deliver 
deductive judgment of victory.
The Causal Reference View
The Causal Reference (CR) view applies the theory of the reference of 
names and natural-kind-terms developed in the 1960s and 1970s, and 
associated with Saul Kripke,15 to the divine case, taking “God” to be a 
proper name. According to this “causal theory,” generally speaking, who 
(or what) a name or natural-kind-term refers to depends on who was 
“baptized” with it when the initial users of that name began to use it. 
Those initial users then communicate it to subsequent users, who defer to 
the initial users regarding its reference. The second generation can be de-
ferred to by the third, and so on, until members of enormous communities 
spread diachronically across time can use the term to successfully refer to 
the initial individual, even if they could never have met that individual, 
and even if they have few true beliefs about the individual. In the case of 
“God,” Alston suggests that religious communities might have ways of 
identifying a common Object of their “religious” experiences and “bap-
tizing” it “God”; the handing down of their religious practices enables the 
communication of the name to subsequent generations.16
CR initially scores well on accessibility because virtually no conceptual 
apparatus is required on the part of “God”-users to successfully refer to 
God using “God.” As Sullivan explains,
Speakers do not need a unique description of God, nor do they even need 
an accurate description of God in order to use a divine name to refer to him. 
Children and anyone else who finds themselves theologically impoverished 
can refer merely by deferring to others who are in a position to refer.17
Unfortunately, Sullivan argues that the linguistic accessibility of God 
is reduced by the potential changing of the reference of “God” over time. 
According to causal theories of reference, irregularities in the causal chain 
between baptism and late speaker can make it the case that the late speaker 
fails to refer to the baptized object. Speakers within the community might 
15The locus classicus is Kripke’s Naming and Necessity.
16Compare the versions of this account given by Alston (“Referring to God,” 118–119) 
and Sullivan (“Semantics for Blasphemy,” 162, and “The Semantic Problem of Divine Hid-
denness”). 
17Sullivan, “The Semantic Problem of Divine Hiddenness,” 43.
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use the already-taken name to baptize a new object, and so introduce a 
“competing chain”:18 if later speakers defer to the re-users of the name, 
they will refer to the new object rather than the old. Things can be more 
complicated: Sullivan gives the case of King Arthur19 to illustrate how late 
inheritors of a name could, on the causal view, refer indiscriminately to 
any member of a collection of objects. Whilst there might have been an 
original baptizand of “Arthur”—let’s say, a retired Roman general gone 
native after too many feasts at Tintagel—a whole band of fictional or ob-
scured heroes hailed in proto-Arthurian epics bear just as strong causal 
relations to the name in our mouths.
Suppose that we, like Alston, take “God” to refer to the common reli-
gious-experiential object of the ancient Israelites.20 Sullivan argues that, 
empirically, that puts “God” users in semantic hot water: “the contempo-
rary Catholic Church is the product of two thousand years of theological 
mergers and acquisitions . . . early Church history is full of events where 
distinct cultures puzzled over how to combine their metaphysical theo-
ries with the growing church. . . . And Catholics are not alone in this; 
nearly every major religion can find syncretistic events in their formative 
years.”21 On CR, then, there is a substantial risk that modern-day users of 
“God” lie at the ends of diverse, confluent, or interrupted causal chains 
so that many do not successfully refer to God, and hence refer to different 
beings or refer with varying degrees of success. Sullivan reckons that this 
risk raises a “problem of semantic divine hiddenness” because many be-
lievers might not have linguistic access to God of the sort we would expect 
personal relationships to require. So, CR puts both God’s semantic acces-
sibility, and the co-reference of “God,” in jeopardy to intellectual history. 
For this reason we should judge the theory to fare poorly with respect to 
our two desiderata.
To shore up the theory, we can offer solutions to the “semantic hidden-
ness” Sullivan identifies. Her preferred response is to add a theological 
epicycle to the Causal Reference view, where divine providence secures 
the causal chain in the required way, through the Holy Spirit’s work in 
the Church. She prefers this to a potential response coming from Alston’s 
original defence of CR, which she regards as inadequate because it would 
restrict the scope of the theory so much that co-reference between theists 
of different Abrahamic traditions would be threatened.22 It’s worth con-
sidering Alston’s alternative, however, since it not only protects CR from 
rendering “God” too semantically vulnerable, and thereby God too inac-
cessible, but also protects CR from a central objection of Gale’s.
18Sullivan, “The Semantic Problem of Divine Hiddenness,” 44.
19Sullivan, “The Semantic Problem of Divine Hiddenness,” 44–45.
20As he does in Alston, “Referring to God,” 121.
21Sullivan, “The Semantic Problem of Divine Hiddenness,” 46.
22Sullivan, “The Semantic Problem of Divine Hiddenness,” 48–49.
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Gale argues23 that it is impossible for subjects of theistic religious ex-
periences to identify that they are seeing the same object as in their last 
experience, and hence as in each other’s, because picking out and re-iden-
tifying individual phenomenal objects requires a zone of at least two 
dimensions in the putative perceptual field. This would make it impos-
sible to satisfy the requirement of CR that God be baptized by ostension 
to begin causal chains of reference. Alston insists that “we should not 
suppose that we can identify a priori any limits on what objective features 
can manifest themselves in patterns of phenomenal qualia . . . we can learn 
only from experience what features and activities of God can be recogniz-
able by the way God presents Himself.”24 Nevertheless, defenders of the 
possibility of identifying God in religious experiences need to have some 
rules by which their subjects would tell the difference between an appear-
ance of God and an appearance of something else, or no appearance at all. 
Alston’s solution is to lean on the practices of the communities in which 
the experiences occur. What he calls “mystical doxastic practices” are sets 
of rules, habits, and attitudes which allow their practitioners to discern 
when God is appearing to them.25 So Abraham and his heirs and succes-
sors can successfully pick out God and dub Him “God” by using their 
mystical doxastic practice (however rudimentary theirs was). They can 
pass on the name for reference by deference to their intention, as well as 
teaching their successors how to re-locate God experientially so that “if 
things go right, we also attain some firsthand experiential acquaintance 
with God to provide still another start for chains of transmission.”26
But the doxastic practice set-up also provides for a solution to Sullivan’s 
semantic problem of divine hiddenness which she calls “the quarantined 
deference response.”27 A practice for discerning when God is appearing and 
when He is not is epistemically respectable, and hence respectable for the 
purposes of baptism by ostension and tradition of a name by testimony, 
only if it is socially established. Socially established mystical doxastic 
practices are much narrower, and more tightly controlled, than the whole 
theistic religious linguistic practice. This narrowness can exclude causal 
chains gone awry, so that practitioners can “avoid the problem of semantic 
shift . . . by resolving to only defer very selectively when [they] use divine 
names,”28 that is, only to successful mystics within their practice.
Unfortunately, Alston’s solution makes each community’s referent of 
“God” semantically accessible to “God”-users only at the directly propor-
tional cost of scope for co-reference across those communities. Whatever 
the object of Ignatius of Loyola’s religious experiences, my fellow spiritual 
23Gale, On the Nature and Existence of God, 7, 327–341.
24Gale, On the Nature and Existence of God, 47.
25Alston, Perceiving God, 184–225.
26Alston “Referring to God,” 119.
27Sullivan, “The Semantic Problem of Divine Hiddenness,” 48.
28Sullivan, “The Semantic Problem of Divine Hiddenness,” 48.
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exercisers and I will have secure and easy access to it via “God” by selec-
tively deferring only to St Ignatius’s usage of “God.” But if we are referring 
to the same object as other Christians, we must be deferring to earlier and 
more figures in our quarantine of “God”-users, and semantic hiddenness 
will return. The situation becomes proportionately worse, God proportion-
ately more “hidden,” as we take Jesuit “God”-users to refer to the same 
object as Jews, Muslims, Zoroastrians, and so on. In other words, advocates 
of CR must choose a trade-off between reduced scope and reduced accessi-
bility if Gale’s objection demands a response like Alston’s.
Sullivan’s preferred solution to semantic divine hiddenness raises sim-
ilar difficulties. She argues that the truth of sufficiently robust accounts 
of providence would imply that the necessary causal chains have in fact 
been preserved.29 St Irenaeus assures us that “the preaching of the Church 
is on all sides consistent . . . and hath its testimony from the Prophets 
and Apostles, because the Spirit uses the Church as ‘a precious vessel’ to 
guard the ‘noble treasure’ of the faith.”30 Sullivan notes that this solution 
ideologically inflates CR to involve divine-providential mechanics as well 
as familiar causal mechanics.31 Other things being equal, then, if Sullivan 
is right about CR’s generation of a problem which demands a theodicy, we 
should prefer a theory which can remain leaner by not raising the problem 
at all. A similar consideration will apply to a similar strategy suggested by 
de Ridder and van Woudenberg:32 all humans respond (perhaps in reli-
gious experience) to the same God via His general revelation. Particularly, 
human religions which involve the theistic religious linguistic system use 
their term translating “God” to pick out the object so responded to. If so, 
when speakers in different traditions call the object of their religious ex-
periences “God,” since it is God indeed who is appearing to them, they 
will co-refer. It will also “refresh” the causal chains and reduce semantic 
vulnerability. The doctrine of general revelation may be true, but if an 
alternative theory of the reference of “God” can do without it, so much the 
better for that alternative.
One final comment about the scope limitations of CR. CR’s advocates 
typically regard it as a reason to prefer CR that, thanks to the common 
29Sullivan, “The Semantic Problem of Divine Hiddenness,” 49.
30Irenaeus, Five Books of S. Irenaeus: Bishop of Lyons, Against Heresies, 302–303.
31Sullivan points out that providence is less inflationary than the “reference magnetism” 
which secular accounts of reference must appeal to in the face of gerrymandered, metaphys-
ically possible beings which match terms’ rules of usage just as well as whatever is picked 
out by baptizing or describing (Sullivan, “The Semantic Problem of Divine Hiddenness,” 49). 
Jumping the gun somewhat, the Worship-Worthiness view appeals to a definite description 
which excludes gerrymandered rivals to God by allowing users to defer to moral facts to 
which they might not have cognitive access. The rules of theological discourse are poorly, 
that is profligately, explained if “God” means some complex definite description which picks 
out a strange being but yet matches our use of “God,” and efficiently explained (I argue) if 
“God” means “the being which is worthy of our worship.”
32de Ridder and van Woudenberg, “Referring to, Believing in, and Worshipping the Same 
God,” 60.
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historical origins of the Abrahamic religion, it provides for co-reference 
between “God”-users of all the Abrahamic faiths.33 The considerations 
I gave to support the scope desideratum might, however, demand a 
higher bar: apparently genuine theological disagreement occurs across 
the boundary between the Abrahamic and other faiths—faiths without a 
common historical origin.
The Descriptive Denotation View
The simplest version of the Descriptive Denotation view is that “God” 
refers to Who it does by standing in for a description of someone, and 
only God satisfies that description.34 DD seems a natural way to think 
about how “God” refers due to the habit of theologians from Arius35 to 
Zizioulas36 of “introducing” their readers to God by giving a list of ad-
jectives intended to differentiate Him from everything else. Because the 
lists of divine names we find in such sources are heterogeneous, presen-
tations of DD need not commit to a specific list as being constitutive of 
the theory—any more than accounts of CR need to commit to a specific 
history of the transmission of the name “God.”
In terms of general theories of reference, DD could be taken to rely on 
a Russellian or Millian view about how names “denote” in virtue of their 
implicit description, along with the understanding that “God” is a name 
in this sense. Understood in this way, however, DD will be vulnerable to 
standard objections to this view of names. Instead, DD can be articulated 
as foregoing the assumption that “God” is a proper name—or even a nat-
ural-kind-term—and supposing “God” stands in for a definite description 
which picks out the set of things which satisfy (perhaps, which could 
possibly satisfy) that description. If the descriptions involved were too 
vague, then DD would immediately fare terribly on the scope criterion 
because co-reference would be threatened by multiple membership of the 
set of those picked out by “God.” Fortunately, however, the candidates 
for such descriptions which we find in theological literature, liturgy, and 
the mouths of believers asked to define “God,” typically render that set 
either a singleton or empty. For example, “the creator of the universe” is 
empty if theism is false, whether because the universe was not created 
or because it was created by committee. When terms are used to mean 
things in this way, we sometimes speak of “denoting” as distinct from 
33See Miller, “The Reference of ‘God,’” 14; Alston, “Referring to God,” 126–127; Sullivan 
“Semantics for Blasphemy,” 162–163 and “The Semantic Problem of Divine Hiddenness,” 39, 
43, for agreement on this point.
34More refined versions could appeal to “cluster concepts” where not all co-referents need 
to have the same description in mind, but the descriptions must be part of a set. The refined 
versions can ameliorate accessibility problems for DD only by expanding the set, reducing 
the chance that the descriptions in the set in fact pick out one thing, and so increasing scope 
problems.
35As quoted in Athanasius, De Synodis 2:15, 2:16.
36See, for example, Zizioulas, Lectures in Christian Dogmatics 40–44.
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“referring,” and “referring” is then restricted for the kind of “meaning” 
that names, specifically, have of the things they name.37 Since either way 
we are answering the question of what “thing” or “person” is “picked 
out” by “God,” whether or not “God” operates like a name or a title, I shall 
continue to write of the “reference” of “God,” even if according to this 
distinction “God” only “denotes” by standing in for a definite description.
DD can be criticized for its threats to accessibility. For any definite 
description of “God” which plausibly has a unique satisfier, many appar-
ently competent “God”-users will not have that definition in mind. We 
can address this by supposing, as Alston puts it, that any such user “has 
in reserve”38 their denoting description, perhaps mnemonically, but more 
normally by deference to others. In doing so, we risk re-introducing the 
ball of tangled deference chains which threatened ordinary believers’ ac-
cessibility on CR. We can, of course, quarantine our deference to untangle 
the ball somewhat—but again, it will come at the cost of co-reference with 
“God”-users at the ends of chains outside our quarantine.
A feature of DD which I find more pressing, however, is that it comes 
with no normative component as to what definite descriptions are good 
candidates for definitions of “God.” Rather, it implicitly tells us to look at 
how the theistic religious practice is carried out to devise one. And when 
we do that, we discover a problem.
DD itself does not specify what definite description allows “God” to 
denote God. So, just as CR delegates the “true story” about the causal his-
tory of the name “God” to intellectual history, DD also delegates the detail 
of working out the correct definite description. But to what discipline? An 
answer which has proven attractive to some theologians is “confessional 
theology.” That is, the one who wants to know what “God” denotes might 
derive a definite description of God from their beliefs about what God is 
like, more than by considering how the word is used.
When this occurs, it is often part of a wider strategy to close a religious 
controversy of the typical “I believe that a is F, but you believe a is G” or 
“We should φ a, not ψ a” forms, and open up a new controversy of the less 
tractable forms “I believe there’s an x which is F, a, but no x which is G, but 
you believe there’s an x which is G, b,” and “We should φ a rather than ψ 
b.” The beliefs cited in such manoeuvres are not even always core creedal 
claims involving concepts widely shared by believers. Consider criticisms 
of natural and liberal theology at the end of the Reformed tradition: 
“The God who is “conceived” by thought is not the one who discloses 
Himself; from this point of view He is an intellectual idol.”39 By taking 
the rather odd properties of having-disclosed-Himself-in-the-Incarnation, or 
37This distinction is drawn in Donnellan’s argument (“Reference and Definite Descrip-
tions,” 281) against Russell’s view of the semantics for definite descriptions and, thereby, 
names.
38Alston, “Referring to God,” 113.
39Brunner, The Christian Doctrine of God, 136.
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not-having-been-conceived-by-thought, to be part of a definition for “God,” 
Emil Brunner does not have to show that Reformed Christianity is correct 
about God and his opponents mistaken. Liberal Protestants and Catholics 
are just talking about something else, something which is an “idol” as far 
as Christians should be concerned. Or consider remarks made by Cardinal 
Burke on Christian and Muslim dialogue in a recent interview: “I don’t 
believe it’s true that we’re all worshipping the same God, because the God 
of Islam is a governor.”40 This absolves him of engaging with the question 
of who is correct about how God wants humans to live and allows him 
to re-cast that question into a question about whose being really exists; 
or—and I think this is telling—whose being is worth trusting for salvation, 
or obeying, or worshipping.
If this manoeuvre occurred all the time, then it would undermine the 
empirical claims about theological controversy made in defence of the 
scope desideratum above. To this reader, however, such manoeuvres 
stand out as notable exceptions to general practice, exceptions which 
sometimes seem not to take the religious aspirations of interlocutors as 
seriously as they deserve. Consider both cases above: Reformed, Cath-
olic, and Lutheran Christians assumed they were disagreeing about the 
same being for five-hundred years before twentieth-century Protestant 
criticisms of natural theology.41 Christian and Muslim theologians and 
religious leaders (if not, perhaps, the authors of popular fiction or polit-
ical propaganda) have almost always regarded each other as disagreeing 
about the nature of one God.
Since DD delegates the task of spelling out how “God” refers in this 
way, it risks massively reducing scope for co-reference. The natural solu-
tion is to take on that task for ourselves, having reflected on the desiderata 
of accessibility and scope, and seek to specify a more principled definite 
description which meets them better. Worship-Worthiness is an attempt at 
that task.42
40Burke, Wheeler, and Fessio, “Final Transcript—Tele-press Conference with Cardinal 
Raymond Leo Burke,” 17.
41See Sudduth’s The Reformed Objection to Natural Theology for an overview of this agree-
ment.
42This way of jeopardizing scope also affects Causal Reference in a roundabout way 
which is worth illustrating in response to de Ridder and van Woudenberg’s confessional 
articulation of the Causal Reference view. Consider differing responses to a thought-experi-
ment offered by Alston in his defence of CR:
[The Satan Case:]
Suppose that an impostor—the devil, one’s internalized father figure, or what-
ever—represents himself as God. We are to imagine someone who, like the Old 
Testament prophets, takes himself to be addressed by God, to be given commis-
sions by God, and so on. But, unlike the Old Testament prophets, as they have 
traditionally been regarded, our chap is really being addressed by Satan. . . . To 
make this the kind of case we want we must suppose that this impostor represents 
himself as the true God, creator of heaven and earth, righteous judge, merciful re-
deemer, and so on. Thus most of the operative descriptions . . . are uniquely true of 
God, while the direct referential contact is with, say, Satan. . . . If it should turn out 
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The Worship-Worthiness View
Having considered the Descriptive Denotation view, we can see that the 
Worship-Worthiness view is a principled iteration of it, rather than a rival 
on the same level as the Causal Reference view. The Worship-Worthiness 
that it was actually Satan, rather than the creator of the heavens and earth, with 
whom they were in effective contact, would we not have to admit that our reli-
gion, including the referential practices involved, is built on sand, or worse (muck, 
slime), and that we are a Satan-worshipping community, for all our bandying 
about of descriptions that fit the only true God? (Alston, “Referring to God,” 121)
Alston finds a positive answer intuitive. Subsequent readers of the case demur. Gale finds 
that “a wide variety of religious believers . . . all answer Alston’s rhetorical question in the 
negative” (Gale, On the Nature and Existence of God, 301). He is thus persuaded that some form 
of DD is true and chooses for his uniquely satisfiable description “being a supremely great 
being . . . and being eminently worthy of worship and obedience” (Gale, On the Nature and 
Existence of God, 8). Jerome Gellman, considering a briefer analogue of the Satan Case (“The 
Name of God,” 541), suggests that communities whose conception of the baptizand is too 
radically different from its actual nature simply fail to refer—his response implies a disjunc-
tive account whereby even a perfectly intact deference chain is an insufficient condition for 
successful reference, so worsening accessibility. Jeroen de Ridder and René van Woudenberg 
take the Satan Case to constitute a counterexample to CR. But rather than adopt DD, they 
attempt to amend CR in two ways. Their second amendment supposes that reference change 
occurs for the user of a term if the sense they attach to that term is sufficiently false of the 
original referent but sufficiently true of another referent (de Ridder and van Woudenberg, 
“Referring to, Believing in, and Worshipping the Same God,” 58). Plausibly, we can identify 
that kind of reference change with the causal circumstance of a teacher failing to pass on a 
term correctly. Applied to CR, it will lead back to the semantic vulnerability of “God” so that 
CR will continue to risk low accessibility.
 Their first amendment is that “when someone who baptizes X is mistaken about X in 
fundamental ways, i.e., about the very kind of thing X is, it is implausible that by baptizing 
X she has introduced a referring expression for X into the language” (de Ridder and van 
Woudenberg, “Referring to, Believing in, and Worshipping the Same God,” 58). This amend-
ment immediately invites the question of which mistakes are sufficiently fundamental. De 
Ridder and van Woudenberg’s suggested standard is “the distinctions between personal 
and non-personal beings, between concrete and abstract entities, between universals and 
particulars, between substances, properties, stuffs, events, processes, and modifications, and 
between creator and created” (de Ridder and van Woudenberg, “Referring to, Believing in, 
and Worshipping the Same God,” 64). When this amendment is applied to ascertain whether 
theistic reference is successful in real-world contexts, it runs into trouble, since
Of particular urgency in relation to the question of coreference among the Abra-
hamic faiths is the question whether the belief that God is not a Trinity should 
count as a fundamental mistake that invalidates reference. We confess to having 
torn intuitions here. On the one hand, whether or not God is a Trinity strikes us as 
a matter of fundamental ontological category; on the other, it doesn’t appear to be 
quite as fundamental as the distinction between, say, personal and non-personal 
or between creator and created. Clearly, an answer to the question whether Jews, 
Christians, and Muslims refer to the same God depends on where you come down 
on this issue. (de Ridder and van Woudenberg, “Referring to, Believing in, and 
Worshipping the Same God,” 64)
 Defenders of the Causal Reference view thus can respond to the Satan Case in two ways. 
If they treat it as an instance of a semantic shift, the semantic vulnerability of “God” is high-
lighted and the semantic problem of divine hiddenness demands a theodicy. If they adopt de 
Ridder’s and van Woudenberg’s alternative strategy, they must either appeal to their confes-
sional commitments to distinguish more or less “fundamental” properties of God; or, they 
must appeal to some other standard. The first option is going to narrow scope again. The 
second option demands the question of what that standard might be. My articulation of the 
Worship-Worthiness view aims to answer that question in a way which aims to widen scope 
and increase accessibility.
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view tells us that “God” stands in for the definite description “the being 
which is worthy of our worship.”
Of course, there are alternative iterations of Descriptive Denotation 
available. The correct iteration could perhaps be “the being which is re-
sponsible for the existence of everything else”; or it could be “the being 
which is capable of saving us”; or “the being which is maximally excel-
lent.” To improve the scope, we could substitute vaguer alternatives for 
these: “the being which is metaphysically ultimate,” “the being which is 
capable of satisfying our ultimate concern,” and “the being which is ulti-
mately valuable,” respectively. It could be a conjunction of these definite 
descriptions.43 A really thorough defense of the Worship-Worthiness view 
would explain, for each of these possibilities, why it fails to satisfy acces-
sibility and scope to the same degree as WW—in as much detail as was 
devoted to showing problems with CR and DD more broadly.
Instead, however, I suggest that there is a generic issue with these alter-
natives, which WW turns out to be free from. The first is that the name the 
definite description “God” stands in for must be possibly satisfied by only 
one being, otherwise the reference of “God” in the mouths of different 
speakers will split too easily. There could in principle be multiple creators 
or multiple saviours. Independently of the considerations I raise below, 
which emerge out of thinking about the nature of worship, there could 
perhaps even be multiple beings who are maximally excellent.
Now, as they are written above, any of these alternatives could include 
a stipulative component to ensure that they are definite descriptions 
which rigidly designate—a “uniquely” element as in “the being which 
is uniquely responsible for the existence of everything else,” “uniquely 
capable of saving us,” and so on. But insofar as they carry such stipu-
lative components these alternatives will be less accessible. “God”-users 
can competently refer even with very limited and inchoate conceptual 
resources. The burden of proof will fall on the advocate of any iteration of 
DD which includes a stipulative component, to show that all these “God”-
users have implicit access to the “artificial” concept resulting from the 
stipulation. Below I will argue that the concept and norms of worship, 
however, are learnt through ordinary social interaction from a young age: 
the kinds of cosmological, ontological, and axiological concepts involved 
in these alternative iterations of DD do not have this advantage.
So, to avoid simply stipulating that God is “the being which is uniquely 
worthy of our worship,” and so make sure pretty much all “God”-users 
have easy access to the concept which picks out God, we need an argu-
ment that our intuitive understanding of worship suggests only one being 
can be worthy of worship. The argument I offer below follows recent anal-
yses of worship which suggest that worship, considered as an attitude, is 
43Schellenberg’s “ultimism” is the view that the object of religious engagement is best 
understood, for reasons of epistemic humility, as whatever meets (if anything does) such a 
conjunct definite description. For a brief prospectus of Schellenberg’s ultimism see his “God 
For All Time.”
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a special case of praise and that desert of both worship and praise tracks 
the excellence of the object of worship. For the sake of concision, I accept 
both of these claims in what follows—but it is worth pointing out that if 
anything is objectively worthy of worship, there is at least one property 
which worthiness of worship tracks. So, an alternative argument to the 
one below should remain viable on alternative sets of properties and asso-
ciated attitudes used to analyze worship.
In their discussion of the phenomenology of worship, Tim Bayne and 
Yujin Nagasawa present what they call the “uniqueness thesis”: that only 
one thing, God, is worthy of worship.44 They suggest that the acceptance 
of the uniqueness thesis is what sets monotheism apart from polytheism: 
in the terms of this debate, they are claiming that the theistic religious lin-
guistic practice definitely involves it, but polytheistic practices might not. 
Plausibly, however, all religious linguistic practices which include the term 
“God” ‘with a capital “G,” alongside the term “god” for other entities their 
religions involve, set the referent of “God” apart from and above those 
gods in some way. The distinction between worship and “mere praise,” or 
between worship and “veneration and hero-worship,” or worship and “in-
stances of worship which should be subservient,”45 tracks the distinction 
between “God” and the gods. So, there is a narrower and intuitive sense 
of “worship,” to which uniqueness seems to apply, at play in all contexts 
where religious language involves the term “God” and not merely “god.”
Bayne and Nagasawa take aim at monotheism for being unable to 
articulate the difference in kind between the attitude owed only to God 
according to the uniqueness thesis and the attitudes we take to our 
creaturely heroes.46 Jeremy Gwiazda’s response is to identify “worship” 
with the degree of praise owed to the most praiseworthy and to identify 
praiseworthiness with excellence.47 At this level of simplicity, Gwiazda’s 
account seems to fit well with the data of monotheistic and henotheistic 
religions—that is, all the religions which use the theistic religious practice. 
On it, any maximally excellent being will be worthy of worship. In order to 
secure uniqueness, however, Gwiazda gives a strong account of maximal 
excellence according to which only the best possible being can count, and 
uniquely so, since that maximal excellence entails His transcendence.48
That Gwiazda appeals to controversial claims about the structure of 
value, in order to guarantee that only one being is worthy of worship, does 
not mean that these claims must be true in order for the uniqueness thesis 
to be true about the nature of worship; nor does it mean that these claims 
must be true, or be believed or understood by “God”-users, in order for 
those speakers to successfully refer to God by implicitly understanding 
44Bayne and Nagasawa, “The Grounds of Worship,” 301. 
45Bayne and Nagasawa, “The Grounds of Worship,” 302.
46Bayne and Nagasawa, “The Grounds of Worship,” 302.
47See Gwiazda, “Worship and Threshold Obligations.”
48Gwiazda, “Worship and Threshold Obligations,” 523.
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“God” to mean “the being which is worthy of worship.” Just as long as 
uniqueness is in fact true of the nature of worship, and God is in fact (for 
whatever reason) solely worthy of worship, then He will be the only thing 
picked out by “God.” The uniqueness thesis and the notion of worship 
which involves it is phenomenologically independent from the axiological 
claims Gwiazda uses to defend its coherence.
I suggest we follow Bayne and Nagasawa in taking the uniqueness 
thesis as data from the phenomenology of religion. And according to it, 
if it turns out that if anyone is worthy of worship, then the set of actually 
existing maximally excellent beings is a singleton. If there are multiple 
beings who are equally best, then no-one is referred to by “God.” If no-one 
is actually the uniquely best then no-one is worthy of our worship, and 
“God” does not refer, except in the fictional or conditional sense discussed 
in the introduction. For now, let’s take the uniqueness thesis to be true so 
that we can easily see how well WW fares against our desiderata. Later, I 
will return to defend it more thoroughly.
One more assumption must be taken as data from the phenomenology 
of worship: that although being the best is necessary for being worthy of 
worship, it is not sufficient. One must also surpass an absolute threshold 
of excellence. Otherwise, WW is subject to a range of counterexamples in 
which “God” refers to pitiful or evil beings just in virtue of their being 
the least pitiful or evil who actually exist. As with the relative excellence 
condition defended above, this condition on worthiness of worship can 
be defended with more substantive accounts of worship or excellence, 
but WW need only commit to the condition, not to any particular reasons 
for imposing it. I take the obvious absurdity involved in worshipping the 
least-evil (or least-pitiful) being available to show that this latter condition 
needs less defense than the uniqueness thesis.
The practices of praise-giving, or whatever other attitudes worship 
might be a limit case of, such as awe or gratitude, are socially endemic and 
learnt young. Analogues of worship can be present and proper in local, 
restricted domains even if only God deserves worship “proper” in a global 
or unrestricted domain. It makes sense to speak of my worshipping my 
older brother qua the most excellent older boy at school, and we can at least 
make sense of our daughters’ worship of Justin Bieber qua most talented 
of pop-stars. Indeed, our disagreement with their judgment will initially 
have to do with Bieber’s talents as a pop-star, not with Bieber’s inferiority 
to Yahweh. If this is true, then there is evidence that we are fast learners 
not only when it comes to praise, awe, and gratitude but, also, about the 
distinction between their common, and their limit, cases of desert.
These examples allow us to flesh out the uniqueness thesis a little more:49 
it tells us that worship belongs only to the best within a given domain 
49This is a somewhat formal way of expressing Bayne and Nagasawa’s observance that 
in some contexts the word “worship” is used in ways that imply multiple objects can be 
worthy of worship. They give two examples: the veneration of saints and fraternal adoration 
of a younger for an older brother, as I have used. In discussing the role uniqueness plays in 
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of comparison. But we can of course conceive of a global domain, of all 
candidates that could possibly be measured for excellence. Then it can 
come out true, all together, that Bieber is in a local sense “worthy” of the 
“worship” children offer to pop-stars, while older siblings are “worthy” of 
the “worship” they offer to older children, while nevertheless only God is 
worthy of worship simpliciter, and it would be improper to worship Bieber 
or one’s older sibling in that global domain.
I suggest that “the being which is worthy of our worship” in the global, 
absolute sense of “worship,” is implicitly understood to define “God” by 
the term’s speakers, even if they would not respond to a question about 
what “God” means by giving WW’s definition.
In this way, the Worship-Worthiness view renders God extremely se-
mantically accessible in terms of both conceptual demands and semantic 
vulnerability. Because the concept of worship comes so easily to us through 
induction into analogous social practices, hardly any “God”-users will 
fail to meet the conceptual demands required to successfully denote God 
with the term. Because the speaker only needs to use the term with an 
implicit associated sense, no history of causal connections to baptizers is 
required. So WW thereby renders God highly semantically accessible by 
rendering “God” semantically invulnerable, relative to its vulnerability on 
the Causal Reference view.
The Worship-Worthiness view also does well in determining wide 
co-reference because it implies that co-reference will cut across religions’ 
different histories, no matter how complex, diverse, or divergent they 
are. It will also cut across religions’ differing metaphysical conceptions of 
God—perhaps not as unilaterally as their histories, but significantly more 
so than on CR or DD. It might be thought that the Worship-Worthiness 
view determines that God must be personal and so splits reference be-
tween those who accept God’s having a mental life and those who reject 
it or believe claims about God which might be taken to exclude it. On the 
other hand, religions which use the theistic linguistic practice, but involve 
theological claims in tension with God’s personhood, nevertheless in-
volve personal language or imagery whenever worship is actually taking 
place: when worshipping ipsum esse subsistens, Christians address God as 
“Father” and “Jesus”; when engaging in worship of Brahman, Hindus 
venerate images. Perhaps this indicates that non-personal objects can be 
worthy of worship, or perhaps it indicates that anti-personal claims about 
God’s nature need to be interpreted rather cautiously.
Defending the Uniqueness Thesis
I have argued that the signal advantage of the Worship-Worthiness view 
over other iterations of Descriptive Denotation is that it can guarantee 
theists’ norms of worship, they argue that the theistic linguistic practice privileges worship 
in the global sense above these other analogical or local instances (Bayne and Nagasawa, 
“The Grounds of Worship,” 302).
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wide co-reference without requiring “God”-users to bear in mind a con-
cept which requires an additional stipulation to prevent reference from 
splitting. This advantage depends on the uniqueness thesis’s being true, 
and true of a concept of worship to which the typical “God”-user gets 
“easy” access through their social induction into widespread habits and 
norms.
But is the uniqueness thesis true? For Gwiazda, the uniqueness thesis 
comes out true of all worship only thanks to controversial claims about 
the structure of value: only the greatest possible being is worthy of the 
most praise, and only one being can be the greatest possible. Bayne and 
Nagasawa initially present the uniqueness thesis as a thesis about the 
norms of worship which theists do or perhaps should endorse,50 while 
elsewhere appealing to it to discredit praise-based accounts of worship as 
though it were intrinsic to worship rather than a theistic postulate.51 So it 
is ambiguous whether they endorse it. Swinburne’s concise presentation 
of a praise- and gratitude-based justification for worship, however, gives 
us one example where it is implicitly rejected: “The first religious reason 
for following a religious way is to render proper worship and obedience 
to whatever God or gods there are” (my italics).52 Following Swinburne, I 
have argued elsewhere that the uniqueness thesis is not a norm of worship 
as such, but a norm of worship only given theism.53 So the uniqueness 
thesis is at least controversial.
Consider the following case:
The Brothers Case:
A wanderer in the desert enjoys a religious experience which impresses 
upon him that its object, which he dubs Jim, is incomparably more ex-
cellent than anything else the wanderer has ever come across. It seems 
to the wanderer that the being must be utterly unique in its excellence. 
Before the object of his experience tells him the following, he is struck 
by an attitude of utmost praise.
50Bayne and Nagasawa, “The Grounds of Worship,” 302.
51Bayne and Nagasawa, “The Grounds of Worship,” 308. Their argument is that if wor-
ship is a special case of some other attitude, and God were worthy of our worship because 
He is worthy of that other attitude, but creatures are also sometimes worthy of that attitude, 
then those creatures would also be worthy of worship. But since uniqueness is true, those 
creatures cannot be worthy of our worship; so neither can God. Bayne and Nagasawa sup-
pose that it would be unacceptable to theists to respond by recognizing an analogical usage 
of the term “worship,” properly used of creatures when they are worthy of great degrees of 
praise, gratitude, awe, or whatever else (Bayne and Nagasawa, “The Grounds of Worship,” 
302). The response offered by Gwiazda, which I have followed here, is that the limit case of 
maximal excellence can occupy the right side of a threshold that triggers an obligation to 
respond with worship, whereas mere praise or veneration are the proper response to beings 
on the other side (Gwiazda, “Worship and Threshold Obligations,” 522).
52Swinburne, Faith and Reason, 168.
53Burling, “Do We Owe God Worship?” 3–4.
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 Then, the object of his experience speaks, and informs the wanderer 
that it is one of a pair of such beings. The wanderer mentally dubs the 
other Tim.54
If worship is the attitude we should take to the most excellent, then it 
seems that, at least subjectively speaking, the wanderer ought to worship 
Jim before Jim informs him about Tim. But uniqueness seems to imply 
that, after Jim informs the wanderer about Tim, the wanderer should wor-
ship neither of them.
On the one hand, this implication seems no more intuitive than re-
sponses inconsistent with uniqueness. Perhaps, after Jim speaks, we are 
obliged to split our praise-giving activities and attitudes equally between 
the two; or perhaps we are obliged to worship just one, but entitled to 
choose between them. On the other hand, perhaps we can distinguish be-
tween a conception of worship on which uniqueness is true, and one on 
which it is not. According to the former the wanderer loses his subjective 
obligation to worship Jim the moment he learns about Tim, but according 
to the latter it is still obligatory or appropriate for him to worship both—or 
perhaps even whichever he chooses.55 What the Worship-Worthiness view 
needs is for the former conception to reflect a moral practice to which we 
have easy access through socialization into praise-giving practices. Then 
WW can be built on that practice, even if there is another nearby alterna-
tive we might also call “worship,” which does not include uniqueness.
Perhaps another angle from which we might see the role uniqueness 
plays in worship is that of the wrongness of idolatry, understood as wor-
shipping the wrong object, rather than worshipping a physical rather than 
personal object. Perhaps idolatry is wrong because it betrays a serious, ex-
clusive commitment that a worshipper has made to her object of worship. 
Although this interpretation receives support from within the Jewish and 
Christian traditions, whose scriptures maintain a strong thematic connec-
tion between idolatry and adultery, this support is not conclusive for us: 
our target is a notion of worship not restricted to any tradition.
It may be instead that the wrongness of idolatry is explained in terms of 
the uniqueness thesis, and the connection between idolatry and infidelity 
54Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for contributing this counterexample to the 
uniqueness thesis. Bayne and Nagasawa consider a more abstract version of it (Bayne and 
Nagasawa, “The Grounds of Worship,” 308) to attack praise-based accounts for violating the 
uniqueness thesis by taking the example to obviously imply that we would be obliged to 
worship both beings and they to worship each other.
55An anonymous reviewer points out that the issue represented by the Brothers Case may 
also be presented by the doctrine of the Trinity. The uniqueness thesis renders Christianity 
polytheistic, if polytheists are those who (idolatrously, according to the thesis) worship mul-
tiple beings. It is possible to interpret passages such as Philippians 2:11 and Revelation 4 and 
5 as implying that the Father and Son are two distinct objects of worship; presumably, it is 
also possible to independently articulate trinitarianism so as to produce the same result. The 
trinitarian defender of the uniqueness thesis should insist that even if these interpretations 
and articulations do indeed result in polytheism, all this shows is that we must affirm the 
Father’s and Son’s consubstantiality in order to render them the same object of worship.
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to an exclusive, explicit commitment is merely a natural one to make, rather 
than idolatry being a special instance of infidelity. The most straightforward 
way to show that the wrongness of idolatry is grounded in uniqueness, 
rather than fidelity to an exclusive commitment, is to give a case where it 
seems right to break off a commitment to worshipping one person, in order 
to worship another, in spite of such a commitment being in place.
The Trade-Up Case:
Tamm is a prophet of Baal, a very impressive being. Tamm leads his 
household and groups of his countrymen in worshipping Baal, who 
is the most excellent being of which Tamm is aware. Baal is not only a 
very powerful lightning-manipulator, but is involved in carefully sus-
taining the human race by supervising his family in managing weather 
and fertility.
 One day, however, Tamm is summoned along with his colleagues to 
watch Elijah, a prophet of a rival deity, Yahweh, carry out a demonstra-
tion to show that Yahweh is more powerful than Baal. The supernatural 
events at the demonstration give Tamm sufficient evidence to believe 
that Yahweh is more powerful than Baal; but they also persuade Tamm 
to take Elijah’s theological claims seriously. Elijah explains that Baal 
does not enjoy sole providential control over nature, but that Yahweh, 
whom Tamm had previously believed to have handed over authority to 
Baal millennia ago, is not only the creator but also continues to exercise 
providential care over humans and animals.
Before the demonstration, Baal is worthy of Tamm’s worship, at least 
subjectively speaking, given Tamm’s information. If we don’t think Baal’s 
attributes as described above put him above the absolute threshold of ex-
cellence required for worthiness of worship, we can stipulate additional 
details in the first part of the Trade-Up Case to satisfy that condition.
It seems that after the demonstration Tamm would be praise-worthy, 
rather than blame-worthy, for transferring his worship over to Yahweh 
given his new epistemic situation—in spite of breaking his standing com-
mitment to worship Baal. At any rate, we are unlikely to accuse Tamm of 
committing idolatry by changing his loyalties. Rather, we might accuse 
him of idolatry for continuing to worship Baal instead of or alongside 
Yahweh, given what he now knows.
So far, however, our response to Trade-Up only shows that the wrong 
of idolatry is not reducible to the wrong of infidelity. To support the view 
that the wrongness of idolatry implies the uniqueness thesis we need a 
case where we judge someone as guilty of idolatry for changing or di-
viding their loyalties between equally-good deities, pace Swinburne’s view 
that worship could be owed to multiple deities at once.
The Trade-In Case:
Tamm is a prophet of Baal, a very impressive being. Tamm leads his 
household and groups of his countrymen in worshipping Baal, who 
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is the most excellent being of which Tamm is aware. Baal is not only 
a very powerful lightning-manipulator, but is involved in carefully 
sustaining the human race by supervising his relations in managing 
weather and fertility.
 One day, however, a priest arrives in Tamm’s land from the distant 
northwest. This priest worships Zeus and performs impressive ceremo-
nies and recites beautiful poetry so that Tamm can see that the priest 
is a reliable source of information about Zeus. Zeus is, by the priest’s 
account, an equally powerful lightning-manipulator and also involved 
in carefully sustaining the human race by supervising his (albeit less 
co-operative) family in managing weather and fertility. All told, Zeus is 
just exactly as excellent as Baal.
For Tamm to now worship Zeus instead of Baal seems like a paradigmatic 
act of idolatry.56 This would remain the case if he simply incorporated the 
worship of Zeus into the religious life of his family and “congregation,” 
alongside Baal. Note that we are not considering his syncretizing Baal and 
56These cases are built from an anonymous reviewers’ observations about ambiguities 
in the norms of worship described in the Old and New Testaments. They point out that, 
in religious-political contexts as they are described in the Old Testament we have nations 
worshipping their own deities or pantheons, while aware of each others’ deities and pan-
theons, and each others’ religious practices. So perhaps our intuitions in response to the 
fictional Trade-In run counter to the actual worship-practices of historical polytheistic re-
ligions. There are three ways of defending uniqueness from this actuality. Firstly, the Old 
Testament record may obscure how each nation really perceived the deities of other nations: 
they may have regarded them as inferior, and hence were in a situation more like Tamm’s 
before encountering Elijah or the priest of Zeus. They may have thought there would be 
some value in changing who foreigners worshipped, but not prioritised doing so; the Old 
Testament implies they made some effort since Israelite kings apparently found their pros-
elytising convincing. Secondly, these uniqueness-violating practices may have been wrong, 
and our intuitions in response to the Trade-Up and Trade-In case reveal this. Then Jews and 
Christians can interpret Yahweh’s interactions with Israel and her rivals and conquerors as 
helping correct humanity’s worship practices in a time and place where, for whatever social 
or political reason, they had become deficient. Thirdly, we can judge these uniqueness-free 
worship-practices of pagan polytheists as described in the Old Testament as in some sense 
a “legitimate” moral practice which is nearby to the one WW calls “worship,” and can sit 
alongside it; then WW will survive as long as WW’s “worship” is commonplace enough in 
social practices.
 A corollary of this reviewer’s interpretation of Ancient Near-Eastern polytheism (or at 
least the plausible construction narrated in parts of the Old Testament) is that, to the extent 
that the Old Testament presents Yahweh as another deity who is distinguished from rivals 
only by his covenant with Israel and his having created the world, Old Testament theology 
will not really be theistic according to WW; and the religious linguistic practice of the Isra-
elites as presented there will not be an appropriate one to analyse to give an account of the 
reference of “God.”
 This might imply that these polytheistic Israelites failed to refer to God: they refer only to 
the fictional character, or tribal deity, Yahweh. By lacking the correct concept of worship, they 
do not have the conceptual apparatus to succeed in referring to God by terms such as “El” 
or “Adonai” according to WW. But, of course, if Yahweh is interacting with them, they can 
refer to Him in the standard causal way using any terms which function as proper names, 
rather than using them in the titular way WW supposes “God” works. If Yahweh is God, 
then they can refer to God using these proper names. (If Yahweh is not God, they cannot.) As 
their theology drifts towards being more properly heno- or mono-theistic through obedience 
to the Law, they will enter into the theistic religious linguistic practice, acquire the necessary 
conceptual apparatus, and then use these proper names as Hebrew for “God.”
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Zeus, in which case he would continue to worship only one being and 
continue to worship Baal. If Tamm would be guilty of idolatry for wor-
shipping Zeus, even though Zeus is just as good as Baal, and if “worthy 
of” is the mirror of “owed to,” then Tamm’s owing worship to exactly 
one deity establishes that exactly one person can be worthy of worship in 
a given domain of excellence. The alternative explanation is that Tamm 
would be guilty merely of a kind of infidelity to Baal, but Trade-Up ex-
cludes such an interpretation. Furthermore, I suggest that once Tamm 
knows about Zeus, he would be unable to approach Baal and lead acts of 
worship toward him in the same good faith as before since he will now see 
Baal as fungible. In a third case where Tamm accesses all the information 
he has across both Trade-Up and Trade-In, we would conclude that he 
should give up worshipping Baal or Zeus for Yahweh.
Trade-Up and Trade-In together show us that the norms of worship are 
stranger than we might initially have noticed. The remaining danger for 
the Worship-Worthiness view is that if we secure the uniqueness thesis 
only by drawing attention to the strangeness of worship norms, we have 
cut it off from the easily-accessed, routinely socially learnt, moral habits 
which made the referent of “God” so accessible. When explaining the con-
nection between “religious” worship and its “everyday” analogues above, 
I gave the example of worshipping a sibling qua best older boy in one’s 
school, and worshipping a pop star qua best among the pop-stars. One 
way of showing that the conception of worship which includes unique-
ness is easily learnt would be to re-run analogues of Brothers, Trade-Up, 
and Trade-In involving school heroes and pop-stars. A difficulty with this 
strategy might be that readers not inclined to hero-worship or fandom 
might apply a nearby concept of praise-giving which often answers to 
“worship” in English, but is distinct from the “worship” used by the Wor-
ship-Worthiness view. The same will arise for other human analogues to 
these cases.57 Hopefully, however, these readers will recognize the plausi-
bility of interpreting creaturely re-runs of these cases in a way favourable 
to uniqueness. If so, they must acknowledge that many others are in 
possession of the conceptual and practical framework which involves 
uniqueness and is required by WW.
An additional strategy is to cast our net wider than praise-giving to 
other ordinary attitudes, governed by readily learnt moral norms, which 
involve something like uniqueness, and see whether they could “teach” the 
“God”-user the normative practice and concept they need for successful 
reference. Here is one suggestion: Scruton argues that the wrongness of 
57For clarity’s sake, here is such an example: perhaps my younger daughter tells me she 
“worships Justin Bieber,” and I can tell from talking to her about what she means, that this 
kind of praise disdains all others—she won’t even take Harry Styles’s name upon her lips. 
But my elder daughter insists she worships Harry Styles and Zayn Malik equally. The Wor-
ship-Worthiness view does not need to insist that my eldest daughter is mistaken; it only 
needs us to be able to recognize that her attitude and practice is different from her sister’s 
and that her sister’s attitude and practise is a common one.
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idolatry is explained by its being “the peculiarity of sacred things, that 
they do not admit of substitutes. . . . The object of worship is to be placed 
apart, in the world but not of it, to be addressed as the unique thing that 
it is.” He claims that this un-substitutability is “what we mean by calling 
it sacred.”58 Importantly, the notion of sanctity at play here is one that, 
Scruton points out, extends over different domains outside of worship. He 
uses it to explain our treatment of corpses, which represent the deceased 
individuals who are non-fungible to the bereaved,59 and also the way in 
which pornography profanes the human by making what we should see 
as a non-fungible person, fungible with any other body.60
Scruton argues that the interest in something just as that individual, and 
not as a member of its kind or as something to use to bring about a state of 
affairs, is a completely routine phenomenon in our intentional lives: it is 
the intentional attitude we take toward any object of aesthetic interest, not 
just humans as beloved persons.61 In the aesthetic case this attitude leads 
us to want to contemplate or admire the object. I see no reason, however, 
why along with our praise-giving practices directed at agents our practices 
of contemplation or admiration directed at objects of aesthetic interests 
should not also play their role in equipping many of us with the notion 
of worship at stake here, one governed by something like the unique-
ness thesis. Certainly, this notion of worship is closer at hand to more 
“God”-users than the theological concepts required by rival iterations of 
Descriptive Denotation and is not vulnerable to the eddies of intellectual 
history like the causal chains involved in the Causal Reference view.
Two Kinds of Counterexample
There are two sources of powerful prospective counterexamples to the 
Worship-Worthiness view. The first is that the view seems to distribute 
modality across claims about God in counter-intuitive ways. For example, 
if “the being that is worthy of our worship” is a description for which 
“God” implicitly stands in, then it will be analytically false that “God is 
not worthy of our worship.” And this might not seem analytically false: 
many logically competent people seem to have been brought to believe 
it by experiences of suffering for which they took God to be responsible. 
Here is how we should handle such cases. In analogous linguistic practices 
involving titles, which refer by picking out a singleton set bounded by a 
description, like “King,” “Champion,” and so on, the semantic reference 
58Scruton, Beauty, 179–180. It could be objected that the Trade-Up Case implies that objects 
of worship can in fact be substituted, since anything else which is the best in the domain will 
“do just as well.” The idolatry involved in exchanging Baal for Zeus in Trade-In, however, 
shows things are not that simple. When Tamm trades up to Yahweh he is not substituting a 
proper object of worship for an equally adequate replacement; rather, he is realising that Baal 
is not a proper object of worship.
59Scruton, Beauty, 177.
60Scruton, Beauty, 162–166.
61Scruton, Beauty, 19–20.
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determined by the description can come apart from the speaker’s refer-
ence. Such practices can involve local usages with messy relationships to 
the global semantics, in which the title comes to be treated as a proper 
name in the Kripkean, causal manner.62 So I could come to treat “God” 
as if it were a proper name for Yahweh rather than a title I take Yahweh 
to bear. Then, when I suffer at Yahweh’s hands, I can coherently (but, if 
Yahweh is God, falsely) believe that “God is not worthy of our worship.” 
“God” can be unworthy of our worship only in the sense that “the Cham-
pion” can be the loser of the tournament.
The second kind of counter-examples I will consider are those where 
beliefs about the nature and activities of God differ so widely that we 
might think that a “God”-user, upon changing their beliefs, comes to view 
their previous beliefs as pertaining to an entity they now regard as fic-
tional.63 They might now think that they had previously failed to refer. But 
on WW, they would be mistaken: they were referring to the being worthy 
of our worship all along, if It exists. The critic of the Worship-Worthiness 
view can argue that WW is mistaken because the beliefs of these char-
acters about their own referential success or failure are better evidence 
than the considerations in favour of WW. This objection presumes that 
practitioners know their own practices’ rules better than those practices’ 
commentators.
Such cases would not function against counterexamples to vague 
definite descriptions with a unique satisfier in non-theological contexts, 
however—in those other contexts, we simply accept that people can 
easily be mistaken about whether or not they successfully referred or 
what they really referred to. Consider the infamous Jack the Ripper. “Jack 
the Ripper,” at least according to Kripke,64 had its reference fixed by a 
definite description something like “the being which committed all the 
Whitechapel murders.” If the Whitechapel murders were perpetrated by 
a team of copycats, “Jack the Ripper” failed to refer to any of them. Sup-
pose in that world our detective discovers the truth: he will realize that he 
had been referring to a fictional character all along. But if the Whitechapel 
murders were perpetrated by one man, then the detective is referring to 
that man. And he will have been referring to that man even if he errone-
ously comes to believe that the murders were committed by a team of 
copycats. This detective is like our Christian who converts to, let’s say, 
neo-pagan polytheism. After her conversion, she believes she failed to 
refer to God since (she believes) there is no being worthy of her worship. 
But if God exists, she successfully referred to God whatever she believes 
about God’s fictional status before her apostasy. Because people can so 
62See Donnellan’s case of the usurper whom both loyalists and traitors call “the King” 
despite both sides knowing he is a usurper (“Reference and Definite Descriptions,” 290–291).
63Thanks to an anonymous reviewer of a previous draft of this article for offering count-
er-examples of this kind.
64For Kripke’s analysis of the Jack the Ripper case see Kripke, Naming and Necessity, 79, 94.
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easily be mistaken about the success (or direction) of their reference, the 
attitudes of characters in these cases about their own referential success 
are not a good reason to reject the Worship-Worthiness view.
Conclusion
The Worship-Worthiness view, which defines “God” as “the being which 
is worthy of our worship,” dominates in competition the rivals that we 
have considered. Causal theories of reference, applied to God, struggle to 
ensure that reference is available to all the users of the term who appear 
perfectly capable of using it; when these theories are refined so as to in-
troduce less semantic vulnerability, they struggle to permit co-reference 
between people who appear to be referring to the same thing when they 
discuss God with each other, or speak to Him alone, or in concert. An un-
principled descriptivist alternative risks restricting successful reference to 
a small minority of those who speak of and speak to “God”; and it cannot 
explain the way in which co-reference is assumed by parties to theological 
controversies who have fundamentally different beliefs about God. The 
Worship-Worthiness view, on the other hand, provides for an account of 
what unites religions whose practitioners speak of and to what they call 
“God” and gives a simple account of how it is they are so routinely suc-
cessful in doing so. If there are strong moral motivations for worship,65 it 
also helps to explain the perennial importance of theology and religious 
behaviour.66
Uppingham School
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